Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response by Richard Weitz
Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 2
Number 3 September 2009
Article 1
Countering the Somali Pirates:
Harmonizing the International Response
Richard Weitz
Hudson Institute
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Commons, and the
Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons
pp. 1-12
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Libraries at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weitz, Richard. "Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response." Journal of Strategic Security 2,
no. 3 (2009): 1-12.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/1Countering the Somali Pirates: Harmonizing the International Response
Abstract
The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and neighboring regions from pirates
operating off the shores of lawless Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. Over the
past year, numerous international security organizations as well as national governments have
organized many separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of
Africa region. Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, this mishmash of ad hoc multinational
and national initiatives has had only a limited effect. These various contingents typically have
conflicting mandates and rules of engagement. They have also become fixated on responding to
immediate problems rather than organizing a robust regional maritime structure, which could replace
the foreign fleets when they inevitably withdraw.
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Countering the Somali Pirates: 
Harmonizing the International 
Response
By Richard Weitz, Ph.D.
Introduction
The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and 
neighboring regions from pirates operating off the shores of lawless 
Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. Over the past 
year, numerous international security organizations as well as national 
governments have organized many separate multilateral and 
single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region. 
Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, this mishmash of ad hoc 
multinational and national initiatives has had only a limited effect. These 
various contingents typically have conflicting mandates and rules of 
engagement. They have also become fixated on responding to immediate 
problems rather than organizing a robust regional maritime structure, 
which could replace the foreign fleets when they inevitably withdraw.
The current confusing mixture of overlapping and competing unilateral 
and multilateral initiatives needs to be reorganized and made more har-
monious. The initial priority should be to improve coordination among 
the diverse flotillas conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. 
A suitable division of labor is needed to take advantage of the unique 
assets of each country and international organization operating in the 
region. Over the longer term, an enduring solution to the Somali piracy 
problem will require the advent of a stable government in Somalia that 
can enforce laws against piracy as well as revive the economy. New 
employment opportunities are required to diminish the appeal of piracy 
to impoverished Somalis. Given adequate logistical and financial support 
by the international community, Somali authorities might at some point 
form an effective coastal force to patrol the country's territorial waters.
Pending the advent and consolidation of an effective government in 
Somalia, the international community should assist friendly groups in 
that country to build the capacity needed to curtail the activities of the 
pirates, insurgents, and other threatening groups operating in Somalia. 
The foreign countries concerned about piracy around Somalia should also 
encourage the littoral states in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, 
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and Red Sea regions—which include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, 
Saudi Arabia, Tanzania as well as Somalia itself—to form a regional mari-
time coastal patrol. Countries external to the area should provide funding, 
training, and advanced surveillance and other technologies to these local 
actors to strengthen their maritime security capabilities.
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
Despite hopes that the arrival of more foreign warships off Somalia would 
curb the spread of lawlessness to the region's vital sea lanes, pirates oper-
ating from that country have resumed the disturbingly high rate of activ-
ity seen in recent years. Since 2006, the number of reported piracy attacks 
in the Horn of Africa region—which includes the Gulf of Aden, the west-
ern Indian Ocean, and the territorial waters of Somalia—has soared. Dur-
ing the first five months of 2009, the number of maritime hijacking 
attempts had already surpassed attempts during all of 2008. Last year, 
the Gulf of Aden was the scene of 111 incidents, including 42 vessels 
hijacked, whereas 114 attempted attacks took place through mid-May of 
2009.1
The growing number and expanded range of these incidents has threat-
ened important trade and transit routes connecting Africa, Asia, and 
Europe. Cargos under threat include shipments of oil from the Persian 
Gulf as well as other valuable commodities. Although the number of 
deaths directly attributable to the pirates has remained small, their activi-
ties have disrupted humanitarian relief operations within Somalia. In 
addition, the economic costs of piracy have included delayed deliveries, 
change of naval routes, damage to ships, higher insurance rates, and the 
detention of crews and passengers for ransom.
The infamous hijacking of the Saudi-owned MV Sirius Star on November 
15, 2008, demonstrates the threat to energy security from Somali piracy. 
At over one thousand feet long, the ship became the largest vessel ever 
captured by pirates. When Sirius Star was attacked, it held about $100 
million worth of Saudi crude oil.2 With their highly valuable cargo and 
wealthy owners, energy vessels travelling through the region are under 
constant threat of piracy.
To avoid confrontation with the pirates, several shipping companies pre-
fer to sail around the Cape of Good Hope rather than through the Suez 
Canal.3 This route alteration causes delays in deliveries, cost increases for 
shipping companies, and a revenue decline for Egypt, whose flow of for-
eign currency depends heavily on traffic through the canal.4 Furthermore, 
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the insurance costs for shipping companies are rising. According to the 
Maritime Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the 
war risk binder cost of a ship's insurance per voyage had increased by 
April 2009 to as much as $20,000, from $500 the previous year.5 
The presence of pirates in a country with strong Islamist groups also 
raises the risk of an alliance between them. Thus far, there is no clear evi-
dence of such an alliance. The media has periodically reported that some 
of the pirates' ransom has gone to Islamist militants.6 In addition, 
al-Qaeda has been urging the Somalis to attack the "crusader forces" in 
the Gulf.7 On the other hand, the radical Council of Islamic Courts and 
some other Islamist groups have denounced piracy as a violation of 
Islamic Sharia law.8 On balance, the pirates seem to be equal opportunity 
brigands, attacking targets regardless of the religion of their crew or own-
ers, and very reluctant to part with their loot, even for the sake of support-
ing fellow Muslim militants.
Somali pirates lack the organization, training, or skills that one might 
expect from a group causing so many problems for the international com-
munity. Launching either from a larger mother ship or from a Somali 
port, the armed pirates use small speedboats to approach and board for-
eign ships. Today's pirates are often people who have fought against each 
other since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the last time that 
the country had a functioning government.9 They are driven overwhelm-
ingly by economic considerations, seeking to acquire wealth in an incredi-
bly impoverished country.10 Since early 2008, Somali pirates have earned 
an estimated $200 million in ransom.11 The widespread violence, the 
weak economy, and the surge in illegal foreign fishing and maritime 
dumping of toxic and other hazardous waste by foreign companies 
exploiting the lack of an effective Somali authority able to police its coasts 
has created an environment in which pirates can easily recruit people to 
their cause.
International Response
Over the past year, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and various national 
governments have organized many separate multilateral and 
single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region. 
At present, the international response focuses on patrolling the sea lanes 
off Somalia's coast, escorting merchant vessels, and responding to dis-
tress calls. Understandably, these actors have remained unwilling to con-
duct a large-scale stabilization campaign on land; the recent experience of 
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foreign occupiers of Somalia suggests such an operation would likely 
incur numerous military and civilian casualties.
This patchwork of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives has 
achieved individual successes, defeating several pirate attacks and captur-
ing some pirates. In some cases, they have exploited opportunities for tac-
tical collaboration against specific pirate threats. Despite the 
unprecedented extent of this effort, the contributions of the approxi-
mately dozens of combat ships and thousands of military personnel have 
been vitiated by insufficient coordination. The various formations have 
employed different mandates, tactics, and rules of engagement. They have 
also become preoccupied with responding to immediate challenges rather 
than engaging in long-term local capacity building.
The United Nations
The UN effort has been manifested primarily through several UN Security 
Council resolutions (UNSCR) calling for international action against 
pirates by member governments and regional security organizations such 
as the African Union. Since 2008, there have been about a dozen resolu-
tions regarding the situation in Somalia. The initial focus was on protect-
ing humanitarian supplies provided by the World Food Program (WFP). 
UNSCR 1816 (June 2008) authorizes foreign member states to conduct 
maritime security operations in Somalia's territorial waters with the con-
sent of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). UNSCR 1846 
(December 2008) permits UN states to provide security assistance—
though not weapons, which are prohibited by a UN arms embargo, with-
out specific UNSC approval—to the TFG to enable its forces to secure 
Somalia's coastal regions. UNSCR 1851 (December 2008) extended these 
authorizations to include, at the request of the TFG, operations on Soma-
lia's land territory aimed at suppressing maritime piracy as well as mili-
tary assistance, including weapons and equipment, to other UN member 
states and regional organizations engaged in combating piracy in Somali 
waters. UNSCR 1853 (December 2008) reaffirmed the UN's commitment 
to the security issues in the region and called upon member states to take 
proactive roles in the operations.
The European Union
On December 8, 2008, the EU organized Operation Atalanta to supersede 
NATO's Operation Allied Provider. Its main task has been to protect the 
WFP deliveries to Somalia. In addition to representing the first EU multi-
national maritime security mission outside of the Mediterranean and the 
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North Atlantic, Atalanta marked the first naval operation launched within 
the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Some two dozen warships and 1,500 naval personnel have joined this 
one-year mission. The EU has also established an online Maritime Secu-
rity Center-Horn of Africa to facilitate the sharing of information about 
maritime threats between EU military personnel and the merchant ships 
operating in the Horn of Africa region.12
The EU sees Operation Atalanta as part of its global action conducted "in 
the Horn of Africa to deal with the Somali crisis, which has political, secu-
rity and humanitarian aspects."13 Therefore, the European attempts aim 
to be more comprehensive than solely providing security. The Joint Strat-
egy Paper for Somalia for 2008–2013 proposes a budget of EUR 215.8 
million under the European Commission's 10th European Development 
Fund, intending cooperation in three main sectors: governance, educa-
tion, and rural development.14
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
From October to December 2008, NATO conducted Operation Allied Pro-
vider, primarily to defend WFP shipments from pirates and patrol the 
area. NATO vessels had the authority to use power where necessary. 
Allied Provider started as a temporary operation upon the request by the 
UN Secretary General in support for UNSCR 1814, 1816, and 1838. The 
fleet consisted of three ships from Standing NATO Maritime Group Two 
(SNMG2), which routinely included contingents from Germany, Greece, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
In March 2009, NATO began another mission, Operation Allied Protec-
tor. This operation now overlaps—and looks to duplicate—Operation Ata-
lanta. NATO's current presence in the Horn of Africa region consists of 
five ships from Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1), a unit 
comprising ships on rotation from member countries such as Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United States.15
Contact Group on Somalia
Twenty-four UN member states and five multinational organizations 
joined the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS or 
Contact Group) established on January 14, 2009. Its main purpose was 
"to develop concrete and substantial responses to the concerns articulated 
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by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1851."16 The CGPCS has the 
potential to address some of the problems already identified, including 
insufficient coordination among the existing initiatives, a lack of 
long-term planning, and disharmonious tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures. But until now, the Contact Group has primarily provided addi-
tional opportunities to monitor the behavior of the other members as well 
as to engage in a sustained dialogue with them. The four working groups 
(dealing with the diplomatic, judicial, military, and public information 
dimensions of the problem) and other cooperative mechanisms originat-
ing from the CGPCS have yet to achieve noticeable progress regarding 
their six main objectives: improving operational and information support 
to counter-piracy operations; establishing a counter-piracy coordination 
mechanism; strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution, 
and detention of pirates; strengthening commercial shipping 
self-awareness and other capabilities; pursuing improved diplomatic and 
public information efforts; and tracking financial flows related to piracy.17
It is unclear how much time the CGPCS will have to accelerate its 
progress. The existing initiatives are all limited-duration efforts whose 
terms will probably end before Somalia becomes a stable state whose gov-
ernment can repress pirates operating from its territory. As these mis-
sions end, new extra-regional maritime operations will be needed to 
replace them unless the region's navies have developed the capacity to 
enforce maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa.
Multinational Operations Led by the United States
The United States has worked to mobilize multinational forces for 
anti-piracy activities. The long-standing multinational Combined Task 
Force 150 (CTF-150), part of the Combined Force Maritime Command of 
the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), has added 
counter-piracy to its original counter-terrorism mission.18 Since its for-
mation after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, CTF-150 has included 
ships from the United States, NATO navies, and other OEF members such 
as Australia and New Zealand. Although CTF-150 falls under the com-
mand of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, its ships operate according to national regu-
lations and rules of engagement.19 The task force took the lead in 
establishing, in August 2008, a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf 
of Aden that, by concentrating merchant shipping within a narrow body 
of water, has facilitated naval escort operations.20
In January 2009, the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) 
established a new task force, CTF-151. It has the same area of operation as 
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CTF-150 (the Gulf of Aden and the sections of the western Indian Ocean 
near Somalia) but—unlike CTF-150, which is responsible for patrolling 
the area and for supporting OEF—the newer task force is dedicated pri-
marily to combating pirates. CTF-151 initially consisted of three U.S. Navy 
ships under the command of Vice-Admiral William Gortney, Chief of the 
U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain.21 CTF-151 has grown rapidly to include 
over twenty ships from many NATO countries and other U.S. allies.
The anti-piracy campaign in the Horn of Africa region marks the first 
widespread participation of the world's rising naval powers in an active 
maritime operation distant from their shores. China, India, and other 
ascending states have sent warships, both to combat pirates and to assert 
their growing importance as global security actors.22 Russia and Japan, 
twentieth-century naval powers whose maritime security ambitions have 
rebounded, also have dispatched flotillas on counter-piracy missions to 
the region. These fleets are primarily escorting vessels flying their flags or 
manned by their nationals, but their governments have expressed open-
ness in principle to assist other ships threatened by pirates.
On January 6, 2009, the Chinese destroyers Haikou and Wuhan along 
with the supply ship Weishanhu arrived in the Gulf of Aden and began 
accepting escort requests from Chinese vessels seeking protection from 
the pirates in the region. After escorting more than one hundred ships in 
the Horn of Africa region by early April, the destroyer Shenzhen and the 
frigate Huangshan relieved the original destroyers, while the Weishanhu 
remained on patrol.23 After the hijacking of the MV Sirius Star, an 
extraordinary session of the Arab League Council condemned the pirates 
and underscored the necessity of "promoting Afro-Arab Cooperation in 
support of efforts to combat piracy."24
Recommendations
The immediate priority is to ensure the security of shipping traffic in the 
region, which requires harmonizing the activities of the existing naval 
operations being conducted by the EU, NATO, and the independent mari-
time commands of the other countries. The U.S. Navy's current maritime 
strategy, with its concept of a "Thousand-Ship Navy," envisages such a 
network under the rubric of the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative. 
Its basic premise is that pooling together the naval capabilities of many 
national fleets, with a suitable division of labor that reflects their distinct 
concerns and capabilities, can best enhance the security of the interna-
tional seas against transnational threats.25 A new UNSCR could help 
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define the command structure for the maritime operations and the per-
missible procedures for disposing of seized ships and captured pirates.
Securing greater cooperation between these fleets and the private entities 
that dominate maritime commerce is also essential. These shipping com-
panies and other firms, which typically function as transnational actors 
even when they are nominally based in one country, possess unique data, 
information, and intelligence that the navies operating off Somalia need 
to achieve effective maritime domain awareness.
An enduring solution to the Somali piracy problem will require the advent 
of a stable government in Somalia that can enforce domestic law and 
order along the country's coasts as well as revive the economy. New 
employment opportunities are required to diminish the appeal of piracy 
to impoverished Somalis. Such a government is unlikely to develop soon, 
but when it takes shape, the United States and other countries will need to 
support it with foreign aid, security assistance, and diplomatic outreach, 
including by promoting its engagement with regional and other multina-
tional institutions.
Pending the advent and consolidation of an effective Somali government, 
the international community should seek to assist friendly Somali author-
ities build the capacity needed to curtail the activities of the pirates, insur-
gents, and other threatening groups operating in Somalia. Since their 
capabilities will remain inherently limited, extra-regional governments 
should also work to promote cooperation among the navies of those 
coastal states in the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea 
regions that commit to countering local pirates and other transnational 
threats. Ideally, these countries—which include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania as well as Somalia itself—will pool their 
resources into a regional maritime security force. This force would engage 
in intelligence sharing, the dissemination of early warning information, 
and joint protection and enforcement operations. In addition to counter-
ing piracy, its missions would address other transnational maritime prob-
lems in the Horn of Africa region, including managing fishing and 
monitoring environmental threats. The pirates have gained some local 
support by claiming to defend Somalis against illegal fishing and mari-
time dumping by foreign fleets. Establishing an official coast guard force 
that included Somali participation would deprive them of this prop as well 
as provide an alternative source of livelihood to potential sea pirates.
The weak naval assets available to the countries in the Horn of Africa 
region will require them to depend on external support from 
extra-regional governments and international organizations. These exter-
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nal actors could provide funding, training, and advanced surveillance and 
other technologies designed to strengthen their capabilities. Over time, 
the extra-regional fleets could reduce their operations as they transfer 
missions to the regional security force. A logical evolutionary path would 
see the international fleets concentrate their non-support efforts on dis-
tant offshore missions while local navies focused on coastal security.
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